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Sergey Antropoff 48df10b17e Prepare 0.1.0 for lab release: durable handlers, HTTP Compose, CI, and pulumi-tests.
- Harden DB-backed handlers and seed profiles; align client wire shapes for
  cluster resources, QEMU config, and node SSL fields
- Serve plain HTTP on Compose :8006; keep TLS optional (--profile tls) and
  terminate HTTPS at Kubernetes Ingress
- Add pulumi-tests (full contract surface majors 6–9 + BPG lifecycle) and
  make pulumi-tests
- Ship bilingual docs, CHANGELOG, SECURITY, CONTRIBUTING, and GitHub Actions
  (make ci + Compose/Helm validation)
2026-07-18 04:18:05 +03:00

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Markdown

**Language / Язык:** [English](SECURITY.md) | [Русский](docs/ru/security.md)
# Security policy
## Supported versions
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| `0.1.x` (latest) | Yes — security reports accepted |
| older / untagged | Best-effort only |
## Threat model (read this first)
This repository is a **local / CI laboratory simulator**, not a hardened
multi-tenant public Proxmox deployment.
Default Compose and Helm values intentionally ship convenient lab secrets,
seeded passwords, open Web UI helper routes (`/ui/api/*`), and compatibility
endpoints (`/admin/compatibility*`). Treat network reachability as the trust
boundary.
**Do not** expose host port `8006` (or a public Ingress) to untrusted networks
without replacing every default secret and adding controls you own.
Full lab notes: [docs/security.md](docs/security.md) ·
[docs/ru/security.md](docs/ru/security.md).
## Reporting a vulnerability
Please **do not** open a public GitHub issue for sensitive reports.
Email the maintainer privately (account that owns the GitHub repository /
Docker Hub `inecs` namespace), or use GitHub
[ privately reported vulnerabilities](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/security-advisories/guidance-on-reporting-and-writing-information-about-vulnerabilities/privately-reporting-a-security-vulnerability)
if enabled on the repository.
Include:
- Affected version / image tag (`inecs/proxmox-api-simulator:…`)
- Reproduction steps against a **local** lab (not third-party instances)
- Impact assessment (auth bypass, secret leak, RCE, etc.)
You should receive an acknowledgement within a few business days.
## Lab secrets that must be rotated outside toy labs
| Secret | Where |
|---|---|
| `TICKET_SIGNING_KEY` | Compose / Helm |
| PostgreSQL password | Compose / Helm |
| Seeded `root@pam` / API tokens | After `seed` |
| `docker/tls/server.key` | Checked-in self-signed material — never reuse outside local Compose |