Initial commit: stateful OpenStack API laboratory simulator.

Ship Keystone auth, multi-service handlers (Yoga→Dalmatian), Compose/Helm
packaging, API contract packs, and pytest/Pulumi coverage labs.

app/security/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"""Authentication, secrets, and authorization boundaries."""

app/security/acl.py

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+"""Capability-driven ACL evaluation with token privilege separation."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+
+from app.contracts.model import Permissions
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class Realm:
+    name: str
+    kind: str
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class Principal:
+    name: str
+    realm: str
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class Role:
+    name: str
+    privileges: frozenset[str]
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class AclEntry:
+    principal: str
+    path: str
+    privileges: frozenset[str]
+    propagate: bool = True
+
+
+def _ancestors(path: str) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    parts = [part for part in path.split("/") if part]
+    return tuple(["/"] + ["/" + "/".join(parts[:index]) for index in range(1, len(parts) + 1)])
+
+
+def effective_privileges(
+    principal: str, path: str, entries: tuple[AclEntry, ...]
+) -> frozenset[str]:
+    privileges: set[str] = set()
+    for entry in entries:
+        if entry.principal != principal or entry.path not in _ancestors(path):
+            continue
+        if entry.path == path or entry.propagate:
+            privileges.update(entry.privileges)
+    return frozenset(privileges)
+
+
+def authorize(
+    principal: str,
+    path: str,
+    required: frozenset[str],
+    entries: tuple[AclEntry, ...],
+    *,
+    token_privileges: frozenset[str] | None = None,
+    require_all: bool = True,
+) -> bool:
+    privileges = effective_privileges(principal, path, entries)
+    if token_privileges is not None:
+        privileges &= token_privileges
+    return required <= privileges if require_all else bool(required & privileges)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class CapabilityRequirement:
+    path: str
+    privileges: frozenset[str]
+    require_all: bool = True
+
+
+def requirement_from_contract(
+    permissions: Permissions | None, parameters: dict[str, str]
+) -> CapabilityRequirement | None:
+    if permissions is None or not permissions.expression:
+        return None
+    check = permissions.expression.get("check")
+    if not isinstance(check, list) or len(check) < 3 or check[0] != "perm":
+        return None
+    raw_path = str(check[1])
+    for name, value in parameters.items():
+        raw_path = raw_path.replace(f"{{{name}}}", value).replace(f"<{name}>", value)
+    raw_privileges = check[2]
+    if not isinstance(raw_privileges, list):
+        return None
+    require_all = not (len(check) >= 4 and check[3] == "any")
+    return CapabilityRequirement(
+        raw_path, frozenset(str(item) for item in raw_privileges), require_all
+    )

app/security/auth.py

@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+"""Password, ticket, CSRF, and API-token primitives."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+import json
+import re
+import secrets
+import time
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+
+from starlette.responses import Response
+
+
+class AuthenticationError(ValueError):
+    pass
+
+
+def _b64(value: bytes) -> str:
+    return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(value).rstrip(b"=").decode()
+
+
+def _unb64(value: str) -> bytes:
+    return base64.urlsafe_b64decode(value + "=" * (-len(value) % 4))
+
+
+def hash_secret(secret: str, *, salt: bytes | None = None) -> str:
+    actual_salt = salt or secrets.token_bytes(16)
+    digest = hashlib.scrypt(secret.encode(), salt=actual_salt, n=2**14, r=8, p=1, dklen=32)
+    return f"scrypt$16384$8$1${_b64(actual_salt)}${_b64(digest)}"
+
+
+def verify_secret(secret: str, encoded: str) -> bool:
+    try:
+        algorithm, n, r, p, salt, expected = encoded.split("$")
+        if algorithm != "scrypt":
+            return False
+        actual = hashlib.scrypt(
+            secret.encode(), salt=_unb64(salt), n=int(n), r=int(r), p=int(p), dklen=32
+        )
+        return hmac.compare_digest(actual, _unb64(expected))
+    except (ValueError, TypeError):
+        return False
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class TicketClaims:
+    principal: str
+    issued_at: int
+    expires_at: int
+    nonce: str
+
+
+def issue_ticket(principal: str, key: bytes, *, now: int | None = None, ttl: int = 7200) -> str:
+    issued = int(time.time() if now is None else now)
+    claims = {
+        "exp": issued + ttl,
+        "iat": issued,
+        "nonce": _b64(secrets.token_bytes(12)),
+        "principal": principal,
+    }
+    payload = _b64(json.dumps(claims, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode())
+    signature = _b64(hmac.digest(key, payload.encode(), "sha256"))
+    return f"PVE:{payload}.{signature}"
+
+
+def verify_ticket(ticket: str, key: bytes, *, now: int | None = None) -> TicketClaims:
+    try:
+        prefix, signed = ticket.split(":", 1)
+        payload, signature = signed.split(".", 1)
+        if prefix != "PVE" or not hmac.compare_digest(
+            _unb64(signature), hmac.digest(key, payload.encode(), "sha256")
+        ):
+            raise AuthenticationError("invalid ticket")
+        data = json.loads(_unb64(payload))
+        claims = TicketClaims(
+            principal=str(data["principal"]),
+            issued_at=int(data["iat"]),
+            expires_at=int(data["exp"]),
+            nonce=str(data["nonce"]),
+        )
+    except (ValueError, KeyError, json.JSONDecodeError) as error:
+        raise AuthenticationError("invalid ticket") from error
+    current = int(time.time() if now is None else now)
+    if claims.expires_at < current or claims.issued_at > current + 60:
+        raise AuthenticationError("ticket expired or not yet valid")
+    return claims
+
+
+def csrf_token(ticket: str, key: bytes) -> str:
+    return _b64(hmac.digest(key, b"csrf:" + ticket.encode(), "sha256"))
+
+
+def verify_csrf(ticket: str, token: str, key: bytes) -> bool:
+    return hmac.compare_digest(csrf_token(ticket, key), token)
+
+
+def set_ticket_cookie(response: Response, ticket: str, *, secure: bool = True) -> None:
+    response.set_cookie(
+        "PVEAuthCookie",
+        ticket,
+        httponly=True,
+        secure=secure,
+        samesite="strict",
+        path="/",
+    )
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class ApiToken:
+    principal: str
+    token_id: str
+    secret: str
+
+
+TOKEN_PATTERN = re.compile(r"^PVEAPIToken=([^!=\s]+![^=\s]+)=([^\s]+)$")
+
+
+def parse_api_token(header: str) -> ApiToken:
+    match = TOKEN_PATTERN.fullmatch(header)
+    if match is None:
+        raise AuthenticationError("invalid API token")
+    identity, secret = match.groups()
+    principal, token_id = identity.rsplit("!", 1)
+    return ApiToken(principal, token_id, secret)
+
+
+SECRET_RE = re.compile(r"(PVEAPIToken=[^=\s]+=)[^\s]+|(password|secret|token)=([^&\s]+)", re.I)
+
+
+def redact_secrets(value: str) -> str:
+    return SECRET_RE.sub(
+        lambda match: (match.group(1) or f"{match.group(2)}=") + "[REDACTED]", value
+    )